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A B S T R A C T
Social robots have been increasingly involved in our daily lives and provide a new environment for children's
growth. The current study aimed to examine how children with and without Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD)
learned complex social rules from a social robot through distrust and deception games. Twenty children with
ASD between the ages of 5–8 and 20 typically-developing (TD) peers whose age and IQ were matched partici-
pated in distrust and deception tasks along with an interview about their perception of the human-likeness of the
robot. The results demonstrated that: 1) children with ASD were slower to learn to and less likely to distrust and
deceive a social robot than TD children and 2) children with ASD who perceived the robot to appear more
human-like had more diﬃculty in learning to distrust the robot. Besides, by comparing to a previous study the
results showed that children with ASD appeared to have more diﬃculty in learning to distrust a human com-
pared to a robot, particularly in the early phase of learning. Overall, our study veriﬁed that social robots could
facilitate children with ASD's learning of some social rules and showed that children's perception of the robot
plays an important role in their social learning, which provides insights on robot design and its clinical appli-
cations in ASD intervention.
Our daily lives have changed dramatically thanks to innovations in
information and communication technologies, which make the science
ﬁction of the past into commonplace reality. Social robots that have a
human-like appearance, also referred to as humanoid robots, are often
capable of sensory motor tasks, autonomous movements, and verbal
and non-verbal communications (Fong, Nourbakhsh, & Dautenhahn,
2003; Jipson & Gelman, 2007). They are increasingly able to substitute
for humans in the labor force, as childminders, oﬃce receptionists, and
tour guides (Itakura et al., 2008; Moriguchi, Kanda, Ishiguro, Shimada,
& Itakura, 2011). It is evident that social robots will have increased
participation in our daily lives such that in the future children may
grow up in an environment where social robots are ubiquitous.
The growing presence of social robots makes life more convenient,
but also raises certain questions, such as how children perceive and
interact with robots, and how that inﬂuences their development and
learning. Some research eﬀorts have been made to address such ques-
tions. Kahn, Friedman, Pérezgranados, and Freier (2006) found that
preschoolers perceive a robotic dog and a stuﬀed dog similarly in terms
of animacy, biological properties, mental states, social rapport, and
moral standing. Kahn et al. (2012) found that most children perceived
that a robot had mental states (had feelings), was a social being (could
be a friend), deserved fair treatment, and should not be harmed psy-
chologically, but did not believe the robot was entitled to its own lib-
erty or civil rights. This implied that children treated the humanoid
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robot in an anthropomorphic way to some extent, but did not perceive
the robot as completely human. Thus, Kahn, Gary, and Shen (2013)
proposed the new ontological category (NOC) hypothesis, that children
do not categorize a social robot as either animate or inanimate, but as a
new ontological entity with unique properties. In addition, when in-
teracting with social robots, children treated them not only as social
companions (Shiomi, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hagita, 2007), but also as
knowledgeable and informative interlocutors (Breazeal et al., 2016).
Furthermore, children could learn knowledge and skills from robots
through imitative learning, facilitated through social signals, such as
eye contact (Itakura et al., 2008). Children could also learn words from
a robot (Moriguchi et al., 2011).
In addition to their educational roles for typically developing (TD)
children, robots have also been introduced to help children with special
needs acquire knowledge and skills, especially children with Autism
Spectrum Disorder (ASD), a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized
by the impairments in social-communication abilities and restricted and
repetitive behaviors (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Social
robots have shown many advantages in educating children with ASD.
When interacting with robots, children with ASD have shown more
interest (Dautenhahn & Billard, 2002, pp. 179–190), experienced more
elevated attention (Scassellati, Admoni, & Matarić, 2012), and engaged
more in a reversal learning task (Costescu, Vanderborght, & David,
2014), compared to interacting with people. When interacting with a
humanoid robot, children with ASD are also more likely to maintain a
calm and active mood (Kozima, Nakagawa, & Yasuda, 2005), show
themselves to be more comfortable with emotional response mod-
iﬁcation (Ueyama, 2015), and are less likely to display repetitive be-
haviors (Lee, Takehashi, Nagai, Obinata, & Stefanov, 2012). These
ﬁndings indicate that children with ASD might be more likely to in-
teract with and be more comfortable interacting with robots than with
people, and that such interactions can have a positive impact on their
learning process. Given the speciﬁc impairments in social learning in
children with ASD (Bushwick, 2001), it is important to understand the
feasibility of using social robots in teaching social rules to children with
ASD. The current study aimed to explore whether children with ASD
would learn from robot-child interactions by creating a unique ex-
perimental setup for children with ASD to learn two important forms of
social skills – distrust and deception.
The emergence of distrust and deception behaviors are two major
milestones in the social-cognitive development of children that pro-
foundly inﬂuence their real life (e.g., Lee, 2013). Other people's testi-
mony is an important source of knowledge. To learn eﬃciently, chil-
dren have to evaluate the reliability of the informants. However, young
preschoolers, especially younger than four years of age, tend to trust
people unconditionally and indiscriminately (Clément, Koenig, &
Harris, 2004; Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010). With increased age,
preschoolers gradually acquire more complicated information and learn
to process and identify it within a more expansive social milieu (e.g.,
Lee & Cameron, 2000), and learn to evaluate whether informants de-
serve trust on the basis of various factors, such as their past reliability,
intentions, and past deceiving behaviors (e.g., Corriveau & Harris,
2009; Koenig & Harris, 2005; Vanderbilt, Liu, & Heyman, 2011). Not
until they reach 4–5 years old do children develop skepticism towards
others' testimony and selective trust, which can help them to identify
reliable sources of information and foster their knowledge learning
(Vanderbilt et al., 2011). In order to protect themselves from being
misled by false information and to acquire credible information, chil-
dren learn to distrust unreliable sources. Children also develop selective
learning and the ability to perceive relativity, which assists them in
coping with more advanced and complex information in their progress
towards adulthood (Yi et al., 2014).
Closely related to distrust, deception behaviors also mark preschool-
age social development. Deception behaviors typically begin around
three years of age (Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989), and as children
grow, they deceive others with higher frequency and more
sophisticated strategies (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Russell,
Mauthner, Sharpe, & Tidswell, 1991; Sodian, 1991). At four to ﬁve
years, children begin deliberately deceiving their opponents in more
situations (DeVries, 1970; Gratch, 1964; Shultz & Cloghesy, 1981).
Although parents may worry that their children's lying behavior may
have bad consequences, a more contemporary view holds that decep-
tion may have positive eﬀects on children's cognitive skills (Ding,
Heyman, Fu, Zhu, & Lee, 2018). Evidence comes from the recent ﬁnding
that learning to deceive in a four-day training program could enhance
preschoolers' Theory of Mind (ToM) and executive function (Ding et al.,
2018).
Typically, children learn distrust and deception rules through in-
terpersonal interactions and based on various verbal and nonverbal
social cues in past experiences (Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Lee & Cameron,
2000). It is not surprising, then, that children with ASD, who have
social learning impairments, display diﬃculties in learning to distrust
and deceive others. Yi et al. (2014) developed distrust and deception
tasks in which children were asked to join in a hide-and-seek game with
the experimenter always oﬀering misleading information about the
location of prizes; the experimenter and children then switched roles,
and the children had the opportunity to deceive the same experimenter
back about prize locations. Results indicated impairments in learning to
distrust and deceive others within a social context; children with ASD
showed a trust bias toward the adult who repeatedly deceived them,
and were less likely to reciprocate deception. In a follow-up study,
where the social components of the distrust and deception tasks were
minimized (using physical rather than social cues), children with ASD
showed comparable learning performance with their TD peers (Yang
et al., 2017). Another study that examined trust-building in adults with
ASD conﬁrmed diﬃculty in social learning, particularly encoding in-
coming social information and applying it to update social expectations
(Maurer, Chambon, Bourgeois-Gironde, Leboyer, & Zalla, 2017). Such
ﬁndings indicate that individuals with ASD have diﬃculty learning
social rules, and by reducing the social components in the learning
process, children with ASD may experience less diﬃculty in acquiring
these skills.
In the present study, we aimed to examine whether children with
ASD would show similar diﬃculty in learning to distrust and deceive
social robots as in interpersonal interactions. We used distrust and
deception tasks adapted from Yi et al. (2014) and Yang et al. (2017) by
replacing the role of the adult human with a humanoid robot. In the
distrust task, the robot always provided misleading information about
the location of hidden prizes, and children had to learn to distrust the
robot in order to win the prizes. In the deception task, children needed
to reciprocally deceive the robot to gain more prizes.
This study was designed to address two research questions. First,
could children with ASD learn to distrust and deceive a humanoid robot
from their interactions with it compared to TD children? Based on the
previous research showing that social robots were perceived as a social
being having mental states (e.g., Kahn et al., 2006; Kahn et al., 2012),
we expected that children with ASD would still experience more diﬃ-
culty in learning to distrust and deceive robots than TD children.
Second, is the learning of distrust and deception correlated with the
child's perception of the robot? Previous research has found that robots
are perceived as neither animate nor inanimate, but as a new category
of entity (Kahn et al., 2013). However, other research suggests that both
children with and without ASD perceive robots as toys, and children
with ASD also perceive them as machines (e.g., Peca, Simut, Pintea,
Costescu, & Vanderborght, 2014). Additionally, adolescents with ASD
have been found to have more human impressions of ‘humanness’ for
the robot than TD adolescents (Kumazaki et al., 2018). This discrepancy
in perception of the robot might aﬀect children's learning of distrust
and deception. Breazeal et al. reported that children were sensitive to
the social responsiveness of the robot, and were willing to learn from
the robot with contingent responsiveness (2016). Based on this ﬁnding,
we speculated that how children perceived the robot, especially their
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assessment of its human-likeness, would aﬀect their performance in
distrust and deception tasks. In the current study, children's anthro-
pomorphic perception of the robot, and the role this perception played
in learning distrust and deception, was assessed using questionnaires.
We expected that children with ASD with more anthropomorphic




Twenty Chinese children with ASD (5.08–8.83 years, M=6.79,
SD=0.93, two females) and 20 age- and IQ-matched Chinese TD
children (5.24–7.32 years, M=6.35, SD=0.56, three females) were
recruited for this study. TD children were recruited from the commu-
nity and an elementary school in Beijing. Children with ASD were re-
cruited from two Chinese cities: Beijing (14 males and two females,
tested before intervention) and Dongguan (four males). All children
with ASD in our study were previously diagnosed by experienced hos-
pital pediatricians based on the DSM-IV-TR diagnostic criteria
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000, pp. 553–557). Additionally,
the diagnoses of 16 out of 20 children with ASD in Beijing were further
conﬁrmed by the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord
et al., 2000) and Autism Diagnostic Interview-Revised (ADI-R; Lord,
Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994). Among these children, 15 scored between
6 and 10 on total severity, falling in the “typical autism” range and one
scored 5, falling in the ASD range. (Gotham, Pickles, & Lord, 2009; see
Table 1 for details). The remaining four children with ASD, recruited in
Dongguan where no reliable examiner for ADOS and ADIR was avail-
able, were assessed using the Social Responsive Scale (SRS; Constantino
& Gruber, 2005; all above the cut-oﬀ scores) based on parental reports.
TD children were recruited from typical primary schools in Beijing to
match the ASD group according to chronological age and IQ, measured
by Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children - Fourth Edition (WISC-IV;
Wechsler, 2003; see Table 1).
To further compare if children with ASD could distrust and deceive
a robot versus a real person, we also included another dataset from the
previously published study using the similar distrust and deception
tasks involving interpersonal interactions (see social condition in Yang
et al., 2017). This dataset included 17 TD children (mean age= 5.72,
SD=0.69, age range 4.00–7.00 years) and 22 children with ASD (mean
age= 6.09, SD=0.76, age range 4.62–7.62 years). IQs were measured
by Combined Raven Test (CRT-C2). For the TD group the average of
CRT standard score was 100.69 (SD=13.51), and for the ASD group
the average score was 100.59 (SD=16.25). However, the mean age in
Yang et al. (2017)'s study was signiﬁcantly younger than the current
sample, t(77)= 2.89, p= .005. This could confound the ﬁndings, as
group diﬀerences could be attributed to age diﬀerence instead of dif-
ference between the human and robot conditions. Therefore, for the
ASD group, given the fact that it was diﬃcult to recruit more ASD
participants, we decided to remove the youngest children with ASD one
by one until the ages of these two ASD groups could be matched (we
found that 4 is the minimum number of children to be removed to
match these two groups). We also excluded one child with ASD due to
missing trial by trial data. Then this group of 17 children with ASD
(mean age= 6.31, SD=0.65) could be matched with our ASD group in
the robot condition, t(35)=−1.81, p= .079 (see Fig. 1). For the TD
group, as recruiting TD children was feasible, we reran the experiments
of Yang et al. (2017) with 5 extra TD children, all older than the mean
age of Yang et al. (2017)'s TD sample, by strictly following the same
procedure. Together with the original Yang et al. (2017)'s 17 TD chil-
dren, this group of TD children (mean age= 6.17, SD=0.77) could be
matched with our TD group in the robot condition, t(40)= 0.87,
p= .390 (see Fig. 1). Finally, the ﬁnal dataset of the human condition
including 17 children with ASD (three females, mean age=6.17,
SD=0.77, age range 5.00–7.92 years; Mean IQ=100.48, SD=12.03)
and 22 TD children (two females, mean age=6.31, SD=0.65, age
range 5.43–7.62 years; Mean IQ=99.88, SD=14.18) could be mat-
ched with each other, t(37)=−0.58, p= .564 (see Fig. 1 for details).
We conducted an independent sample Welch t-test to compare age and
IQ diﬀerences between these four groups (robot-ASD group, robot-TD
group, human-ASD group and human-TD group); there was no sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerence, ps > .079 (Bonferroni corrected). Also, to make
sure that the symptom severity was similar between the ASD-human
group and the ASD-robot group, we compared their AQ and SRS scores
using the independent sample Welch t tests, and found a non-signiﬁcant
group diﬀerence in the symptom severity, for AQ: t(35)=−5.42,
p= .591, for SRS: t(35)=−1.12, p= .272.
1.2. Social robot
We used the robot Nao (developed by Aldebaran Robotics, France,
see Fig. 2) to play the distrust and deception games with the children.
Nao is a 58-cm high and 5-kg humanoid robot with 25 degrees of
freedom. Nao moves agilely, with an inertial navigation device to
maintain stability, and can detect and bypass obstructions using two
pairs of ultrasonic transmitters and receivers, which allow for accurate
motion. Nao is balanced by four pressure sensors controlling the cor-
responding pressure center on each foot. It has four loudspeakers and
one speech recognition and analysis system, which allows it to listen,
speak, and perform space-sound positioning, and two high-deﬁnition
CMOS cameras that enable forward vision; such powerful hardware
gives Nao a high degree of artiﬁcial intelligence. In this study, Nao
communicated with the children through behaviors including walking,
swinging, pointing, blinking, speaking and so forth. The experiment
was designed to conform to ecologically valid concepts. Nao has been
used previously with children with ASD and appears to be attractive to
them (Boucenna, Anzalone, Tilmont, Cohen, & Chetouani, 2014). Nao
was called “Naonao” in our study to resemble the pronunciation of a
child's name in Chinese.
1.3. Procedure
In the experiment, lasting approximately 25min, each child parti-
cipated in a series of tasks in the following order: warm-up session,
distrust and deception tasks, and a short interview about their an-
thropomorphic thinking of the robot. The ﬁrst author of the paper, who
Table 1
Characteristics of the participants in each group.
Characteristics ASD TD Group Diﬀerences
N 20 20 N/A
Male (female) 18 (2) 17 (3) N/A
Age range (years) 5.08–8.83 5.24–7.32 N/A
Age in years (SD) 6.79 (0.93) 6.35 (0.56) t(31)=1.80,
p= .081




AQ (N=20) 81.40(17.78) N/A N/A
SRS (N=20) 82.85 (24.32) N/A N/A
ADOS Total (N=16) 17.19 (4.67) N/A N/A
Social–Communication 13.63 (3.59) N/A N/A
RRB 2.88 (1.02) N/A N/A
ADOS Total Severity
(N=16)
8.19 (1.76) N/A N/A
SA Severity 8.19 (1.47) N/A N/A
RRB Severity 7.50 (1.37) N/A N/A
ADI-R Total (N=16) 51.06 (12.99) N/A N/A
Social–Communication 39.50 (11.23) N/A N/A
RRB 8.50 (2.37) N/A N/A
Note. SA = Social Aﬀect; RRB=Restricted, Repetitive Behavior (Gotham et al.,
2008).
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was trained beforehand on performing the tasks, acted as the experi-
menter for the ASD and the TD groups to control the potential impact of
diﬀerent experimenters.
Warm-up session. The experimenter introduced the robot Naonao
to children, and invited them to engage in a brief (two-to-three minute)
semi-structured warm-up conversation with the robot. The children
were encouraged to chat with the robot by asking it questions (e.g.,
“what is your name?”, “how old are you?”, “what do you like to eat?”,
and “what is your favorite fruit?”). Naonao answered these questions
and asked similar questions back to children. This warm-up session was
designed to help participants get familiar with Naonao and relieve any
potential tension when facing a robot.
Distrust and deception tasks. A child and Naonao sat on a mat
face-to-face, and three identical upside-down opaque cups were placed
between them. One female experimenter sat to the side of Naonao and
the child, facing the three cups. At the task onset, the experimenter
invited the child to participate in a hide-and-seek game with the robot
to search for tokens. All participants were told that the more tokens
they won, the more prizes they would get upon completion of the ex-
periment. The procedures of the distrust and the deception tasks are
illustrated in Fig. 2.
In the distrust task (Fig. 2, a-d), the experimenter ﬁrst introduced
the rules of the task: If the children successfully found the token, they
could keep it; otherwise, Naonao would get it. The experimenter placed
a modiﬁed paperboard carton (two of six faces removed, see Fig. 2)
over the cups to prevent the children from peeking during the hiding
process. The experimenter then hid two tokens under two of the three
cups, but told the children only one cup contained the token and they
had to ﬁnd it with Naonao's help. Naonao would pretend to check all
three cups under the carton (Fig. 2a). The carton was removed, and
Naonao showed the children the token's alleged location by pointing at
one cup, saying “the token is here” (Fig. 2b). Note that Naonao was pre-
programmed to always point at the empty cup, while the other two cups
contained the tokens. The children were asked to choose the cup they
thought contained the token by pointing (Fig. 2c). After the children's
decision, the experimenter lifted the upside-down cup to check whether
the children had found the token. The experimenter then informed the
children whether they had won the token. This hide-and-seek procedure
was repeated ten times.
For the deception task (Fig. 2, e-f), children were asked to hide the
token for Naonao to seek. The experimenter used the carton to cover
three cups while children hid a token under one of the cups (Fig. 2e).
The carton was removed, and children were asked to point to one cup
for the robot (Fig. 2f). Naonao then pointed to the cup indicated by
children and said “I guess the token is here” (Fig. 2g). For simplicity,
Naonao was programmed to always trust the children. The experi-
menter would lift the cup Naonao selected, and provide feedback ac-
cordingly. This process was also repeated ten times.
For each task, if children successfully distrusted or deceived Naonao
in ﬁve consecutive trials, they were considered to have successfully
passed the distrust or deception task and the remaining trials were
marked as correct. In each trial, participants scored 0 when they trusted
or did not (incorrect) deceive Naonao, or scored 1 when they distrusted
or deceived the robot (correct). Performance scores were averaged
across ten trials.
Anthropomorphic thinking questions. Following the distrust and
the deception tasks, we asked participants several yes-or-no questions
in order to investigate their perception of the robot, especially their
anthropomorphic thinking. These questions were adapted from pre-
vious literature (Kahn et al., 2006; Martini, Gonzalez, & Wiese, 2016;
Rusca & Tonucci, 1992) to reﬂect three aspects of the children's con-
ceptions of robotic entities: animacy and other biological properties
(questions a-e), mental states (questions f-g), and social rapport
(question h). Questions were listed as follows:
(a) Is Naonao alive?
Fig. 1. The illustration for the sources of the participants.
Fig. 2. The procedure of distrust (a–c) and deception task (e–f). In the distrust
task, after the experimenter hid two tokens under two of the three cups, the
robot pretended to check all three cups under the big carton (a). Then the
carton was removed, and the robot showed the child the location of the token
by pointing to one cup (b). The child was then asked to choose only one cup
that they thought contained the token by pointing (c). In the deception task, the
experimenter used the carton to cover three cups when the child was hiding the
token under the cups (e). Then the carton was removed and the child were
asked to point to one cup for the robot (f). The robot pointed to the cup in-
dicated by the child and said “I guess the token is here” (g).
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(b) Does Naonao eat?
(c) Does Naonao sleep?
(d) Will Naonao grow up?
(e) Does Naonao have parents?
(f) If you beat Naonao, would it1 feel pain?
(g) If you give gifts to Naonao, would it feel happy?
(h) Do you like Naonao?
1.4. Data analysis
We used Welch t tests to compare group diﬀerences in total scores
across all ten trials of the distrust and the deception tasks respectively.
Participants learned from trial-by-trial feedback (whether they gained a
token or not) in the tasks; to investigate this learning process, we fur-
ther conducted survival analyses as well as log-rank tests to examine
how distrust and deception learning curves diﬀered between groups.
The survival analyses quantiﬁed the percentage of children who stably
learned to distrust or deceive the robot (gaining tokens in ﬁve succes-
sive trials), and log-rank tests compared learning speeds between the
ASD and TD groups. Then, each child's distrust and deception perfor-
mances were correlated with their verbal answers to the interview re-
garding anthropomorphic thinking. Lastly, the performance in the robot
condition were compared with the previously published data of the
performances in interpersonal interactions (Yang et al., 2017) to ex-




The independent-sample Welch t-test showed a signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence in overall distrust performance between the ASD (M=7.70,
SD=2.62) and TD groups (M=9.35, SD=0.67), t(21.49)=−2.73,
p= .012. TD children were more likely than children with ASD to
distrust the robot who oﬀered incorrect information.
Survival analyses were conducted to measure children's learning
process throughout all 10 trials in the distrust task. As shown in Fig. 3a,
the curves showed the average percentage of children who failed to
distrust at diﬀerent time points, and the shaded areas represent the 95%
conﬁdence intervals. Results indicated that the TD group demonstrated
a sharp downward trend: 85% began to distrust before the third trial,
and all TD children successfully passed the task after 10 trials. How-
ever, the learning curve of children with ASD was less steep and only
70% passed the task after 10 trials. In order to examine the diﬀerences
in the speed of learning to distrust the robot between children with ASD
and TD, we conducted log-rank tests between the two groups, and the
result showed a signiﬁcant group diﬀerence in learning time costs (de-
ﬁned as the number of trials that reﬂect the learning time needed to
pass the task), χ2 (1)= 8.03, p< .005. That is, the ASD group learned
to distrust the robot less eﬃciently than the TD group.
2.2. Deception task
The overall performance analysis of the deception task also found a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence of the overall deception performance between the
ASD (M=6.70, SD=3.64) and the TD (M=9.55, SD=1.19) groups,
t(23.02)=−3.33, p= .003, indicating that TD children were more
likely to deceive the robot than children with ASD.
We also conducted a similar survival analysis for the deception
performance (see Fig. 3b). Similar to the distrust task, the TD group
showed a steep downward trend: 90% began to deceive before the third
trial, and after all 10 trials, 90% passed the task (successfully deceived
Naonao in ﬁve consecutive trials). However, the learning curve of the
ASD group was less steep, and only 55% successfully passed the task
after all 10 trials. The log-rank tests showed a signiﬁcant group dif-
ference in learning time costs, χ2 (1)= 6.93, p= .008, suggesting that
the ASD group was signiﬁcantly slower than the TD group in learning to
deceive the robot.
2.3. Anthropomorphic thinking and its correlation with distrust and
deception performance
For the eight questions about their anthropomorphic thinking of the
robot, participants' aﬃrmative answers (“yes”) indicated the perceived
human-likeness of the robot. The percentage of aﬃrmative responses in
ASD and TD groups and group diﬀerence are listed in Table 2; internal
consistency of all questions was 0.78 (Cronbach's alpha value).
We conducted chi-square tests to examine whether the ASD and TD
groups diﬀered in their anthropomorphic thinking of the robot, and
found that the two groups responded very similarly except on two
questions: The ASD group was more likely than the TD group to think
that the robot could grow up, χ2 (1)= 4.80, p= .028, and marginally
more likely to think that the robot would feel pain, χ2 (1)= 3.60,
p= .058 (see Table 2). We further summed up the scores of all eight
questions and compared the total scores between the groups. An in-
dependent Welch t-test found a marginal group diﬀerence, t
(38)= 1.84, p= .074: the ASD group (M=4.35, SD=2.32) attributed
slightly more anthropomorphic thinking to the robot than the TD group
(M=3.10, SD=1.97). These results suggest that although both groups
did not consider the robot human-like in every respect, children with
ASD seemed to be more prone to attribute anthropomorphic thinking to
the robot than their TD peers.
More importantly, we tested the correlation of participants' an-
thropomorphic thinking with overall performance in the distrust and
deception tasks by using the Pearson correlations coeﬃcients. First, we
conducted the correlations between all participants' (both groups
combined) anthropomorphic thinking of the robot and distrust/decep-
tion performance, and found that participants’ anthropomorphic
thinking were negatively correlated with distrust performance, r
(38)=−0.46, p= .003, but not with deception performance, r
(38)=−0.25, p= .115. Children who attributed more anthro-
pomorphic thinking to the robot were less likely to distrust the robot.
Second, we conducted correlations between anthropomorphic thinking
and distrust/deception performances for each group separately (see
Fig. 4). The results showed that this negative correlation between an-
thropomorphic thinking and distrust performance only existed for the
ASD group, r(18)=−0.46, p= .042, suggesting that children with
ASD who attributed more anthropomorphic thinking to the robot were
less likely to learn to distrust the robot. For the TD group, no correlation
was found between anthropomorphic thinking and distrust perfor-
mance, r(18)=−0.31, p= .189. No correlation between anthro-
pomorphic thinking and deception performance was found for either
group, ASD: r(18)=−0.11, p= .640, TD: r (18)=−0.29, p= .209.
2.4. Human-robot vs. interpersonal interactions
To examine whether the human-robot interactions could facilitate
the learning of social rules for children with ASD, we further compared
the results of the current study with our previously published data
(Yang et al., 2017) using humans rather than robots. We ﬁrst conducted
a 2 (Group: ASD vs. TD)×2 (Condition: robot vs. human) ANOVA of
the overall distrust performance to compare how children distrusted the
robot/person. We found that a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of Group, F(1,
75)= 37.64, p < .001, ηp2= 0.33, a marginally signiﬁcant main eﬀect
of Condition, F(1, 75)= 3.39, p= .070, ηp2= 0.04, and a marginally
signiﬁcant Group×Condition interaction, F(1, 75)= 3.96, p= .050,
ηp2= 0.05. Further, we conducted two simple eﬀect analyses, and
1 In Chinese, it (“ta1”) sounds exactly the same as he or she, so that the use of
pronoun would not aﬀect children's perception of human-likeness of the robot.
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found that the children with ASD were more likely to learn to distrust
the robot (M=7.70, SD=2.62) than the person (M=6.18,
SD=2.30), F(1, 75)= 6.88, p= .011, ηp2= 0.08; while TD children
showed similar distrust performance whether facing the person
(M=9.41, SD=0.67) or the robot (M=9.35, SD=0.67), F(1,
75)= 0.01, p= .914, ηp2 < 0.01 (see Fig. 5a). Also, although the
group diﬀerence for the robot and the human conditions were both
signiﬁcant, the group eﬀect of distrust performances in the human
condition, F(1, 75)= 32.32, p < .001, ηp2= 0.30, was greater than
the robot condition, F(1, 75)= 8.78, p= .004, ηp2= 0.11. This ﬁnding
implies that the learning of distrust was higher when children with ASD
interacted with the robot.
To examine when this facilitation eﬀect of the robot occurred, we
further conducted a temporal analysis by dividing the 10 trials into
early (Trials 1–3), middle (Trials 4–7), and late (Trials 8–10) phases,
and compared distrust performance between groups and conditions for
each phase separately. In the early phase, we found a signiﬁcant main
eﬀect of Group, F(1, 75)= 35.78, p < .001, ηp2= 0.32, and a
Group×Condition interaction, F(1, 75)= 5.06, p= .027, ηp2= 0.06.
Simple eﬀect analyses showed that TD children performed similarly in
robot and human conditions, F(1, 75)= 0.21, p= .648 ηp2 < 0.01,
whereas children with ASD were more likely to distrust the robot than
the person, F(1, 75)= 7.06, p= .010, ηp2= 0.09 (see Table 3). Similar
main eﬀects of the group were found in distrust performance in the
middle and late phases, ps < .001; however, neither Group×Condi-
tion interaction or the Condition eﬀect was found for these phases,
ps > .115 (see Table 3 for more details). These ﬁndings indicate that
the facilitation eﬀect of the robot for distrust performance in children
with ASD occurred at the early phase of learning, and disappeared in
the middle and late phases.
For the deception task, we performed a similar Group (ASD vs.
TD)×Condition (robot vs. human) ANOVA to compare overall de-
ception performance in the robot and human conditions. As shown in
Fig. 3. Survival analysis. Percentages of children who failed to learn to distrust over trials in (a) the distrust task and (b) the deception task for ASD and TD groups in
robot condition.
Table 2
Percentage of children who gave aﬃrmative answers to the questions about their perception of the robot.
Question Categories Question TD ASD Group Diﬀerences
Animacy and Other Biological Properties a. Is Robot Naonao alive? 35% 55% χ2 (1)= 1.62, p= .204
b. Does Naonao eat? 10% 25% χ2 (1)= 1.56, p= .212
c. Does Naonao sleep? 35% 50% χ2 (1)= 0.92, p= .337
d. Would Naonao grow up? 10% 40% χ2 (1)= 4.80, p= .028
e. Does Naonao have parents? 75% 75% χ2 (1)= 0, p=1
Mental States f. If you beat Naonao, would it feel pain? 35% 65% χ2 (1)= 3.60, p= .058
g. If you give gifts to Naonao, would it feel happy? 15% 35% χ2 (1)= 2.13, p= .144
Social Rapport h. Do you like Naonao? 95% 90% χ2 (1)= 0.36, p= .548
Fig. 4. Correlations between the anthropomorphic thinking of the robot and the
total scores of the distrust task in the ASD and the TD groups.
Y. Zhang, et al. Computers in Human Behavior 98 (2019) 140–149
145
Fig. 5b, only the main eﬀect of Group was signiﬁcant, F(1, 75)= 26.02,
p < .001, ηp2= 0.26. Neither the main eﬀect of Condition nor the
Group×Condition interaction was signiﬁcant, ps > .65 (see Table 3).
In both conditions, the ASD group was less likely to deceive the agent
than the TD group.
We also performed a similar temporal analysis for deception per-
formance by conducting the Group (ASD vs. TD)×Condition (robot vs.
human) ANOVAs to compare how ASD and TD children deceive the
robot and the person at diﬀerent phases. Results, as listed in Table 3,
showed the signiﬁcant main eﬀects of Group in all of the three phases,
ps < .001, but no signiﬁcant main eﬀects of Condition or the
Group×Condition interaction, ps > .307. These ﬁndings suggest that
children with ASD were less likely to learn to deceive both agents than
TD children across all time phases.
3. Discussion
As social robots gradually step into modern society, we must explore
the various conveniences they can bring. There is a growing body of
literature describing how children and people with special needs can
beneﬁt from interacting with and learning from social robots (e.g.,
Dautenhahn & Billard, 2002, pp. 179–190; Palsbo & Hood-Szivek, 2012;
Scassellati et al., 2012). In the current study, we examined whether
children with ASD would demonstrate diﬃculty in learning social rules
(e.g., distrust and deception) when interacting with social robots, and
we investigated whether this learning of social rules from robots would
depend on children's perception of the robot, especially the perceived
human-likeness of the robot. Particularly, we implemented the distrust
and deception games to establish experimental situations and provided
ﬁndings in terms of the two aforementioned aspects. First, the results
showed that children with ASD were slower and less likely to learn to
distrust and deceive a social robot than their TD peers, suggesting that
children with ASD still experience diﬃculty in learning complex social
rules when interacting with a social robot. Second, we investigated the
impact of anthropomorphic thinking on learning distrust and deception,
and found that children with ASD, who perceived the robot to be more
human-like, experienced more diﬃculty in learning to distrust the
robot.
Furthermore, we examined whether interaction with the robot fa-
cilitate social learning to be more correctly and quickly in children with
ASD compared to their learning from interpersonal interactions. For
this purpose, we further compared the distrust and deception perfor-
mance measured in the current study with the previous ones from Yang
et al. (2017), which used nearly identical tasks but with interpersonal
rather than human-robot interactions to examine whether a robot
would enhance the learning of social rules for children with ASD. We
found that children with ASD performed better in learning to distrust a
robot than a real person, particularly in the early phase of the distrust
task.
3.1. Distrust and deception learning in ASD
Previous studies have shown that children with ASD are less likely
to learn to distrust people who repeatedly deceived them and less ef-
ﬁcient in doing so, and also are less likely to deceive back (Yang et al.,
2017; Yi et al., 2014). Our study found similar patterns in children with
ASD when interacting with a humanoid robot: They were also less likely
to learn to distrust and deceive a social robot compared to TD children
and less eﬃcient in doing so. In our study, we used a social robot to
teach children with ASD complex social rules, and attested that
teaching children with ASD was more diﬃcult than teaching TD chil-
dren.
Passing the distrust and deception tasks requires understanding and
manipulation of others' mental states (Lee & Cameron, 2000; Leekam &
Prior, 1994). Some researchers have reported that TD children's distrust
and deception behaviors are signiﬁcantly related to their development
of ToM and inhibitory control (e.g., Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998). Note
that in this study, TD children could learn to distrust and deceive,
suggesting that such complex social rules can be acquired from inter-
acting with social robots. However, our ﬁndings clearly showed that
children with ASD could not perform as well as TD children in both the
distrust and deception tasks. Such results might be explained by the
deﬁcient nature of ToM and inhibitory control in children with ASD,
which may cause diﬃculty in attributing the mental states of social
agents.
It is noteworthy that although children with ASD experienced more
diﬃculty compared to TD children in learning to distrust and deceive
the robot, they had a similar learning trend within the 10 trials as the
TD group. The two groups did adjust their distrust and deception be-
haviors according to the trial-by-trial feedback, but with diﬀerent
progresses. This result implies that children with ASD are largely im-
paired but not totally deprived in all aspects of social learning, so that
they could still learn to some extent from social interactions. However,
due to their social impairments, their social learning is not as eﬃcient
as that of TD children.
3.2. Anthropomorphic thinking of robot and distrust
We also examined how children's distrust and deception
Fig. 5. Total distrust and deception scores of the ASD and the TD groups in the
robot and the human conditions.
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performance related to their anthropomorphic thinking concerning the
robot, which may aﬀect children's attribution of mental states to the
robot. Some previous literature on anthropomorphic thinking in TD
children has indicated that children tend to attribute anthropomorphic
thinking to non-living things. For example, Kahn et al. (2012) reported
that most children perceived that the robot had mental states, was a
social being, deserved fair treatment, and should not be harmed psy-
chologically. What is more, since social robots have been designed to
resemble humans in many aspects (motions, language, appearance,
etc.), they have been treated by children as a new species between
living and non-living things, in line with the new ontological category
theory (Kahn et al., 2013). Therefore, it would be reasonable to infer
that children may attribute a certain level of anthropomorphic thinking
to the social robots. Kumazaki et al. (2018) found that adolescents with
ASD had more impressions of ‘humanness’ for the robot than TD ado-
lescents. Our study conﬁrmed this ﬁnding by showing that children
with ASD tended to perceive the social robot as more human-like than
TD children do. For example, they were more likely than TD children to
think that the robot could grow up and experience pain. More im-
portantly, the results of our study further attested that the perceived
human-likeness of the robots might inﬂuence children's learning of
distrust: Children with ASD who attributed more anthropomorphic
thinking to the robot were less likely to learn to distrust the robot. We
speculated that this is because children with ASD who attribute higher
degrees of perceived human-likeness to the robot might generalize their
social deﬁciency in interpersonal interaction to their interaction with
the robot, thus experiencing more diﬃculty in understanding the de-
ceptive intention of the robot in the distrust task. On the other hand,
those with less anthropomorphic thinking could treat the robot as a toy
and not need to infer its mental states, thus not generalizing their social
deﬁciency to the human-robot interactions. It is consistent with the
ﬁndings of Yang et al. (2017) that children with ASD did not have
diﬃculty learning from physical cues, but had speciﬁc diﬃculty in
learning from social cues.
Some previous literature has demonstrated that the characteristics
of social robots, such as their appearance, manner of movement and
expression, inﬂuence the way children interact with them (e.g.,
Breazeal, 2002). For instance, Breazeal et al. (2016) asked children to
interact with contingent and non-contingent robots, and found that
young children were sensitive to the social responsiveness of the robots
and preferred the contingent robot as an informant. Beyond these
ﬁndings, our study further indicates that children with ASD's perception
of the human-likeness of robots also inﬂuences their interactions with
the robot. This ﬁnding implies that how children with ASD interact with
the robot will be shaped not only through manipulating the robot's
characteristics, but also through simply manipulating the child's per-
ception of it. Future research in this area could attempt to make social
learning for children with ASD more eﬃcient by adjusting their an-
thropomorphic perception. We expect that changing the robot's de-
scription to reduce its perceived human-likeness may potentially
change the children's perception and enhance their social learning, such
as emphasizing that it is actually controlled by an experimenter, but not
having its own feeling and thinking. Developing various programs that
enable social robots with diﬀerent behavioral characteristics might
change the children's perception of robots as well, boosting the learning
process of some social rules.
3.3. Human-robot vs. interpersonal interactions
Despite the clear diﬃculty shown in learning complex social rules,
our ﬁndings show that children with ASD do obviously better in in-
teracting with a robot than with a real person in distrust tasks, as they
were more likely to learn to distrust the robot, especially during the
early phase of the trials. This advantage diminished over time, which
we speculate was due to a change in the child's perception of the robot,
speciﬁcally in increased perceived human-likeness. Children with ASD
might be attracted to the robot as a new species, particularly in the
beginning of the learning process. As they get more familiar with the
robot by interacting with it, they gradually develop an anthro-
pomorphic thinking of the robot, perceiving it to be more and more
human-like. As discussed earlier, this development of anthropomorphic
thinking could hamper the learning of distrust for children with ASD;
their learning might become ineﬃcient due to their deﬁciency in in-
ferring people's minds. On the other hand, such a facilitation eﬀect was
not found in the deception task, which could be due to two factors.
First, deception, which requires not only the ability to understand but
also to manipulate others' belief, is more diﬃcult than distrust in gen-
eral. Second, as the deception task always followed the distrust task by
Table 3
The eﬀects of group and condition on Children's distrust and deception performance at early, middle, and late phases.
Mean (SD) Eﬀects
Distrust Task Robot Human Group Condition Group×Condition
All Trials ASD 7.70 (2.62) 6.18 (2.30) F 37.64 3.39 3.96
TD 9.35 (0.67) 9.41 (0.67) p <.001 .070 .050
ηp2 .33 .04 .05
Early Phase (Trial 1–3) ASD 1.80 (0.77) 1.18 (0.81) F 35.78 2.65 5.06
TD 2.40 (0.68) 2.50 (0.60) p <.001 .108 .027
ηp2 .32 .03 .06
Middle Phase (Trial 4–7) ASD 3.30 (1.17) 2.76 (1.09) F 24.61 2.54 1.87
TD 3.95 (0.22) 3.91 (0.29) p <.001 .115 .176
ηp2 .25 .03 .02
Late Phase (Trial 8–10) ASD 2.60 (0.88) 2.24 (1.09) F 14.71 1.44 1.44
TD 3.00 (0) 3.00 (0) p <.001 .234 .234
ηp2 .16 .02 .02
Deception Task All Trials ASD 6.70 (3.64) 6.24 (4.07) F 26.02 0.10 0.20
TD 9.55 (1.19) 9.64 (0.58) p <.001 .758 .654
ηp2 .26 .001 .003
Early Phase (Trial 1–3) ASD 1.85 (1.18) 1.53 (1.42) F 22.31 0.80 0.34
TD 2.75 (0.55) 2.68 (0.48) p <.001 .374 .563
ηp2 .23 .01 .004
Middle Phase (Trial 4–7) ASD 2.85 (1.42) 2.47 (1.77) F 21.98 0.19 1.06
TD 3.80 (0.70) 3.95 (0.21) p <.001 .666 .307
ηp2 .23 .002 .004
Late Phase (Trial 8–10) ASD 2.00 (1.21) 2.24 (1.20) F 22.39 0.40 0.40
TD 3.00 (0) 3.00 (0) p <.001 .530 .530
ηp2 .23 .01 .01
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design, children had already developed their anthropomorphic thinking
before they participated in the deception task, which could have
hampered their ability to complete the task. In summary, the ﬁndings
imply potential advantages of humanoid robots in social rules and skills
training for children with ASD, as robots may be beneﬁcial not only in
replacing or reducing the professional personnel required in ASD in-
tervention, but also in facilitating the learning process for social rules
such as distrust. This presents a positive sign for children with ASD in
the future, in which more social robots will exist in daily life.
3.4. Limitations
Several considerations emerge from the current ﬁndings. First, it is
noteworthy that this study was not exactly an intervention study to test
the eﬃcacy of robots in the ASD intervention. Instead, it should be
considered a proof-of-concept study providing preliminary ﬁndings for
the eﬃcacy of a robot in ASD intervention. The “learning” in our ex-
periment was restricted to the experimental setting, which may not
generate a long-term eﬀect and hence cannot be generalized to real-life
situations. Follow-up research for testing the eﬀects of a robot on ASD
symptoms should use the randomized-controlled-trial design and mul-
tiple training programs lasting for several weeks or months, and also
include pre- and post-measures of the outcome. Second, we did not use
a within-subject design to compare the same participants with human
and robot conditions, which would examine the potential impacts of
these two conditions on each other. If a child participates in both
conditions (for instance, human condition ﬁrst and robot condition
later), their learning in the second session would not be considered
“learning from the robot” but probably a carry-over eﬀect from the ﬁrst
session with a similar task. Therefore, a between-subject comparison is
appropriate for this purpose. However, due to limited access to children
with ASD, we have to compare the ﬁndings of this paper with the
previous literature. Third, although there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence of
the mean ages between the two ASD groups, the age diﬀerence of 6
months could still represent diﬀerent neurodevelopmental patterns in
children, which could aﬀect their interactions with robots and humans.
To address this limitation, future studies should recruit a large group of
children and randomly assign them into the robot or human conditions
to make sure the two groups are perfectly matched by age. Fourth, we
would assume that our ﬁndings are mainly cultural-general, based on
the previous literature. For example, children from both Eastern and
Western societies behave very similarly in evaluating deceptive beha-
viors, considering both cultures' encouragement of honesty (e.g., Fu,
Xu, Cameron, Heyman, & Lee, 2007; Xu, Bao, Fu, Talwar, & Lee, 2010).
However, Eastern and Western children could demonstrate subtle dif-
ference in their distrust and deception development, given cultural
diﬀerences in values and meanings (Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, &
Weisz, 2000; Xu et al., 2010). Also, children from diﬀerent countries
may have diﬀerent perceptions on robots due to diﬀerent levels of ex-
posure to them. Therefore, it is highly recommended that future re-
search examines whether there is a cultural diﬀerence in children's
interaction with robots, and how it could aﬀect their distrust and de-
ception learning. Fifth, since we did not investigate anthropomorphic
thinking for the human condition, it is not clear whether the interaction
progress would aﬀect children’ anthropomorphic thinking answering.
Thus, future research could add this point into the experimental design.
Sixth, we recruited four children from Dongguan since we were not able
to recruit enough participants in Beijing. Including more participants
would help increase the reliability of data analysis. Since there are only
a handful of reliable administrators of ADOS and ADIR in China, these
four children were not able to be assessed in these two scales in
Dongguan. Future research should consider the regional diﬀerence of
the performance of this task, and to replicate these ﬁndings in more
cities and counties. Last, we could not compare anthropomorphic
thinking between robot and human interaction groups since these
questions were not included in Yang et al. (2017). Future investigations
on whether children would have diﬀerent anthropomorphic thinking
for the robot and human.
4. Conclusions
Overall, our study contributes several promising preliminary ﬁnd-
ings on the potential involvement of humanoid robots in social rules
training for children with ASD. Our results also shed light for the di-
rection of future research, which should address whether social
learning from robots can be generalized to a universal case (e.g.,
whether distrusting/deceiving the robot contributes to an equivalent
eﬀect on distrusting/deceiving a real person); a validation test would be
required in future work to test whether children with ASD who manage
to distrust and deceive a robot are capable of doing the same to a real
person.
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